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Abstract
‘Breaking the silence’ is necessarily part of women being able to obtain their rights and resolve issues of violence in their lives. Indonesian women domestic violence victims’ experiences have shown that they often have opportunity to access many resources when they start ‘breaking the silence’ and reaching out to others (individuals and agencies) in regard to the violence being suffered (usually at their husbands’ hands), although not all resources were useful in individual cases. The passage by the Indonesian government of the Domestic violence Act in 2004 increased people’s awareness of domestic violence issue (including women’s awareness) of domestic violence. While aims to protect women (and children), in reality the ability of the women victims to assert was different for each woman. This was large attributable to the varied understanding of the legal officers encountered and their consequent responses. Indonesian women consider police responses negative when reported violence, particularly non-physical violence. Police still find obstacles to investigating claims where non-physical violence is reported by victims, although the legislation covers ‘non-physical’ violence such as psychological and sexual violence, and neglect, as well as physical violence.
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I.	INTRODUCTION 
Encouraging women experiencing domestic violence to ‘breaking the silence’ and supporting them in this action is a necessary part of women being able to obtain their rights and resolve issues of violence in their lives. The experiences of Indonesian women victims of domestic violence have shown that they have often had opportunity to access many resources when they started ‘breaking the silence’ and reaching out to others (individuals and agencies) in regard to the violence they were suffering (generally at the hands of their husbands), although it must be acknowledged that not all resources were helpful and useful for individual cases.​[1]​ However, breaking the silence and disclosing domestic violence within a family is a course not easily undertaken because of values that have been embedded which emphasize the necessity of maintaining family harmony, a role often largely assigned to women. Disclosing domestic violence also has a number of consequences for women victims who are affected psychologically, financially, and even physically. 
This article will discuss non-physical violence (neglect and psychological violence) in the context of the Indonesian Domestic Violence Act 2004 and the experience of an Indonesian woman who was a victim of non-physical violence. It will include her efforts to access the legal system to resolve the violence. The author initially obtained information regarding her experience in an interview when the author was providing legal counselling at the author’s then workplace in 2014. In July 2016, the woman gave her consent for the use of the interview material for this article.   
II. NON-PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA’S DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
ACT 2004
The Indonesian government issued Undang-Undang Penghapusan Kekerasan dalam Rumah Tangga (Elimination of Domestic Violence Act) in 2004. The Act defines domestic violence as: 
     a conduct committed by a person against the other, particularly women, that causes physical, sexual,   
     psychological suffering, and/or neglect, including threatening to do an act, forcing someone to do something 
     or illegally ‘seizing [another’s] independence in the household sphere’ (restricting liberty or freedom of 
     movement).​[2]​ 

The scope of the Act is quite broad because it can be applied not only to persons in intimate relationships, in particular to married couples but also members of the same household, including domestic workers.​[3]​  Based on this Act, the scope of ‘household’ includes: a) husband, wife, and children; b) people whose family relationship with those people (the individual referred to under a) is due to blood relationship, marriage, suckling at the same breast,​[4]​ care, and guardianship, who lives in the household; and c) any person working to assist the household and living in the household shall be considered as family member during the period they are in the household.​[5]​ The scope of the victim is expanded not only to include the family members and relatives but also domestic workers (for example, house-keepers, carers and nannies) because in many cases such employees experience violence from their employers, while there is no regulation provided by government to protect their safety.​[6]​  
	Based on the Act, there are four types of violence, namely physical violence, psychological/emotional violence, neglect, and sexual violence. Two of the four types of violence can be categorized as non-physical violence, namely psychological/emotional violence and neglect. Physical violence towards a person means any conduct that causes physical pain and injury.​[7]​ Psychological violence towards a person means any conduct that causes the victim feeling fear, lack of self-confidence and distress.​[8]​ Neglect is another form of violence regulated by the Act, which maintains that the neglect of anyone by another is prohibited, because according to the law and agreements, the person has an obligation to provide basic necessities or to look after family members. Further, someone may be accused of neglect if the conduct has a negative impact on those who are financial dependents of the accused, or restricts the alleged victim’s freedom to work either inside or outside the household, or has caused someone else to restrain the person who desires to work.​[9]​ A person can be accused of perpetrating sexual violence by compelling someone to have sexual intercourse with the accused, or compelling the alleged victim to have sexual intercourse with someone else for commercial and/or other purposes.​[10]​ 
	The Elimination of Domestic Violence Act 2004 (or Domestic Violence Act 2004) is the first Indonesian legislation governing the rights of the victims in detail.​[11]​ The rights of the victims of domestic violence provided in Article 10 include as follows: 1) protection of the family, police, prosecutors, courts, advocates, social institutions, or any other party either temporarily or based on the determination of a court protection order; 2) health services in accordance with medical needs; 3) special handling related to the confidentiality of the victim; 4) assistance from a social worker and legal assistance at every level of the examination process in accordance with the provisions of legislation; 5) spiritual guidance services.​[12]​ The police are obliged to immediately provide temporary protection to the victim (that is, within a period of 24 hours). In providing temporary protection, the police may cooperate with a health worker, social worker, companion volunteer, and/or spiritual mentor who may accompany the alleged victim.	
Then, for the purpose of providing services to women victims, the central and local government provide special units in police offices, as well as social workers and legal aid assistance; establish and develop a system of and mechanism for networking for the purpose of helping the victim to access such services; and gives protection to assistants, witnesses, and members of the victims’ family and their friends. 
The Act not only gives the responsibility to government to prevent and stop domestic violence, but also involves the recognition of the role of the community. Therefore, it recognize a mutual obligation between the government and society, an important action in the prevention of domestic violence. Hence, the involvement of the community is needed in monitoring and preventing the occurrence of domestic violence in any neighbourhood. The role of the community is accommodated in Articles 14 and 15 of Elimination of Domestic Violence Act.​[13]​ 
This existence of this section is expected to reduce cultural obstacles to intervention  by community members where violence occurs within the family sphere and overturn the assumption that such violence is a ‘private’ family matter; instead, under this section, community and broader family involvement to prevent or end such violence is considered an obligation. Other cultural obstacles remain such as a sense of failure over not being able to meet expectations to maintain family harmony, victim reluctance to disclose their circumstances due to feelings of shame, even guilt over the violence that has occurred, a fear of being blamed by family and the surrounding community, and hesitation regarding initiating a complaint or proceeding with a case out of consideration for the family unit.​[14]​  
	The Act also regulates the mechanism of the domestic violence order so as to enable a victim to be protected within 24 hours. Police have an obligation to apply for the order before the court, and then investigate the reported complaint. The victim herself or (with her authorisation) a family member or someone else can report the violence directly to police. For child victims of domestic violence (that is, person under the age of 18 and including domestic employees as well as offspring or forested person) such a report can be made by a parent, guardian, or by the children themselves.​[15]​     
 	Within in a specific period (7 days) of an application having been accepted, a court must issue the domestic violence order. An application for the order can be made by the victim, their family, police, or a designated assistant (social worker, legal aid counsellor, religious personnel). In certain cases, consent from the victim is not needed where the application is made by a party other than the victim. Based on the request of the applicant, the court makes apprehended domestic violence orders to protect the designated person from the violence.​[16]​ 
	Police are entitled to arrest an alleged perpetrator in order to protect the victim if they are convinced that there has been a breach of the apprehended domestic violence order.  Any breach of such order, can be reported to the Court by the victim, police and assistants. The court, then, investigates the matter. If the court is convinced that the purported perpetrator has breached the order, the court obliges the perpetrator to make an undertaking that she/he will comply with the undertaking. Any breach of such an undertaking will result in detention for 30 days. The above outlines are the duties of the legal apparatus in dealing with domestic violence cases in terms of a victim or other party seeking and obtaining an apprehended domestic violence order, and then consequences in the event of its breach. It does not deal with additional criminal charges that may be lodged.
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT 2014 AND ITS POSITION IN THE 
       INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
The Domestic Violence Act cannot be separated with the Marriage Act 1974 and other legislation, namely Peraturan Pemerintah Pelaksanaan Undang-Undang Perkawinan 1974 Nomor 10 Tahun 1983 (PP 10/1983) [Implementing Regulation of Marriage Act 1974 No 10 of 1983 on Government Regulations on Permission for Marriage and Divorce for Civil Servants].​[17]​ Another relevant piece of legislation issued by the Indonesian government is the Compilation of Islamic Law (Kompilasi Hukum Islam/KHI) through an Instruksi Presiden [Presidential Instruction] No1/1991.​[18]​
	Bearing in mind that these Acts are laid down within different jurisdictions, the Marriage Act 1974 in family law and the Elimination of Domestic Violence Act 2004 in criminal law, the existence of this legislation has made the Indonesian government provide systems and agencies to support the legislation. The Marriage Act 1974 is applicable nationally despite the multiple religions. The court applicable as the institution to process the marriage and divorce issues, however, differs between the Muslim group and non-Muslim groups because of the division of the legal system during the Dutch Colonial period which persists to this day,​[19]​ while, the Criminal Court has been integrated within State court system.​[20]​ 
	 Some scholars believed that the Indonesian Marriage Act reflects male and state domination of women. It can be argued that it is unjust towards women since a husband can have more than one wife simply if his wife cannot bear him a child. Whilst in theory the first wife’s permission must be sought before a man contracts a second marriage, the unequal power distribution in many marriages (as well as the threat of divorce) discourage resistance. The other reason many view the Marriage Act as reinforcing patriarchal and outdated values is that the Act defines a husband as a ‘head of the family’ and a wife as ‘housewife’ or mother of household.​[21]​ The concept of these respective roles of the husband and wife is believed by many to be the main cause of the continued subordination of women to men within marriage.​[22]​ For example, married women are never considered ‘main income earners’ even when they earn more than their spouses, unless they are certified as widows or if the husband is unable to work. Such status is conferred only upon request.​[23]​ 
	Another provision of the 1974 law involves divorce. Under the Marriage Act 1974, men as well as women must submit a petition to the court to obtain a divorce (whereas under traditional Islamic law, men could simply pronounce their divorce three times for it to be final). Both sexes are required to give ‘sufficient reasons’.​[24]​ The implementing regulation of the law enumerates examples of ‘sufficient reasons’: adultery; compulsive drinking, drug taking, or gambling; desertion for two consecutive years; the spouse having a jail sentence of more than five years; endangerment of one spouse by the other; disease or handicap which prevent the carrying out of marital (sexual) duties; and continuous arguments caused by irreconcilable differences.​[25]​ Then, if judges are convinced of the validity of one or several grounds of divorce presented by the applicant, they will grant a divorce. According to the Marriage Act, either the wife or husband can present as a litigant before the court.​[26]​ 
	The Marriage Act 1974 insists that a husband and a wife are equal and have the same right before the law and in the community. They both have obligations and rights in regard to work, and to help, and assist each other.​[27]​ The legislation regulates the responsibilities of the husband and wife based on their gender roles; and, if one of the parties fails to fulfil such obligations the other can bring the matter to court.​[28]​ Failing to fulfil one’s obligations can be categorised as neglect of the other party since the legislation has determined the responsibilities of each party to the other.​[29]​ ‘Neglect’ is not only mentioned as a ground for divorce in the Marriage Act, but also in the taklik-talak. Therefore, if a husband violates the taklik-talak, his wife can use his failure to adhere to it as a ground for divorce.​[30]​ Although domestic violence is not stated specifically stated as such in the legislation, a number of grounds for divorce is regulated in the Marriage Act 1974 and the Compilation of Islamic Law that could be categorised as representing such behaviour. These include where one party is cruel or mistreats the other, and endangers the life of the other party.​[31]​ Other grounds are a spouse’s adultery, alcoholism, drug addiction, gambling or other vices which are difficult to cure.​[32]​ Wilful neglect, too, where a husband refuses to supply a living to his wife (due to gambling or other vices, rather than an ability to gain employment) is a form of domestic violence.​[33]​ The remaining ground is one very close to ‘irreconcilable differences’, that is, that ‘between husband and wife there are persistent disputes and quarrels, and no hope of peace alive in the household’.​[34]​ This can often operate as a ‘polite’ substitute for an admission of violence. 
	These laws also regulate the provision of living (maintenance) for a divorced wife through such Articles as Article 41of the Marriage Act 1974,​[35]​ Articles 8(1)-(6) of PP 10/83,​[36]​ and Articles 149, 152 and 156 of the Compilation of Islamic Law.​[37]​ The Marriage Act 1974 determines the responsibilities of the husband in relation to his provision of a living to his ex-wife but fails to the kind or extent of the maintenance in detail. A similar issue is also regulated by PP 10/1983. If the husband is a civil servant who has filed for divorce, he must give two-thirds of his earnings to his ex-wife and children (or half to wife if there were no children). This obligation must be fulfilled until his ex-wife remarries. However, female civil servants or others whose spouses are not civil servants and who request divorce forfeit any right to maintenance, with an exception made only if the application for divorce was due to polygamy. PP 10/1983 has, to a certain extent, has ensured that women whose husbands work as public servants have greater financial security after divorce than women whose husbands are not civil servants.​[38]​  
	Under the Compilation of Islamic Law, a woman will obtain maintenance if her husband initiates the divorce. If, on the other hand, she initiates the divorce (perceraian or gugat cerai), she will not obtain rights that would otherwise be due to her as a divorced woman. Articles 149 and 152 of the Compilation of Islamic Law govern this area. Article 149 states clearly and in detail the responsibilities of the husband who utters talak/divorces his wife under Islamic law. When one turns to Article 152 with its title that mentions ‘the consequences of perceraian/divorce’, there is no statement about the responsibility of the husband to ex-wife; it only mentions the responsibility of the father to the children. 
These pieces of legislation, particularly PP 10/83 and the Compilation of Islamic Law, have shown that they do not really take into account women’s rights when women become active litigants.​[39]​ Instead women who are active litigants in a divorce lose certain rights that they would otherwise have enjoyed as divorcees; they only retain such rights (for example, maintenance) if their husbands are the active litigants.​[40]​ 
IV. BREAKING THE SILENCE: THE WAY TO STOP THE VIOLENCE AND  
                                       ACCESS THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Breaking the silence is a process undertaken by women who have had experience of domestic violence in order to disclose and stop violence against them. This process included a number of elements, and it is initiated by responding to a turning point by thinking about and conceptualising what is happening to them. The next step is negotiating with themselves and with the perpetrator, and the last step is trying various strategies to decrease or stopping the violence. This article will now turn to the experiences of an Indonesian women, RHY, which demonstrates this process and exemplifies many aspects of the common aetiology of the experience of women victims of domestic violence (in instances of neglect and psychological violence) whilst also extending (as she is a civil servant’s wife) into areas less commonly shared. Her cases also has peculiarly individual aspects regarding documentation dificulties. It also illustrates the precarious nature of cohabitation or de facto marriage (as was the case early in their relationship) rather than legal marriage. This single case thus embodies numerious dimensions. 
A. The Case of RHY
RHY and SJ (later her husband) had cohabitated since 1989. SJ had promised that because they lived together, he would take responsibility for RHY and their children (two children from her previous marriage and a child born of their cohabitation) by giving her a living allowance. However, he repeatedly broke his promise. Every time she had asked for the living, SJ showed his salary transcript (with deductions already made) and argued that the salary had been subtantially docked to pay for his study. RHY was not brave enough to ask for a living for herself, her children from the previous marriage, or even for their own child because she recognized her low status as a woman living an illegal marriage. She wanted to keep harmony within the relationship, and keep the affection of their child by keeping calm, being patient and never asking for a living. During the period of cohabitation, SJ worked as a driver in State Court Office, and RHY was a bailiff - a civil servant in the same office that employed SJ. 
RHY tried to be understanding about his circumstances and she had helped herself and the children by selling ‘pecel’ (mixed vegetables with peanut sauce) to provide her with a living and meet the children’s needs. She desired and expected that a living allowance finally be given to her after he finished his study. However, after he had finished studying, and even after he had married her legally in 2002 and become a clerk in a State Court, he still failed to give her a living allowance for her and the children (not even his own child). He argued that he never took his salary as it was used to repay money borrowed to buy a motor cycle, which he had done without her permission. As a consequence of his expenditure and consequent lack of take-home pay, RHY continued to spend her monthly salary to meet the family’s daily needs.  She realised that she could not rely on her husband for living since her husband’s bank account statement always showed no money in his account, even his salary was debit rather than a credit because he had much a large bank loan and had authorized deductions from his wages to finance his acquisition of the motorcycle and a car. His financial circumstance was further worsened by his addiction to gambling. Given that her husband did not take care of her and never gave her a living allowance, she had forced herself to continue selling ‘pecel’ at home after working hours in order to get extra money to maintain the family.​[41]​ During this time, her husband himself relied on her for a living. 
She insisted on staying with her husband although he never gave her money during their marriage for a number of reasons, as among them that she still loved him, and she wanted to keep family harmony; moreover, she did not want to divorce for the second time.
 SJ’s addiction to gambling had a direct impact on her life. She tried to remind her husband to stop gambling; however, her efforts did not have any effect on him. This issue emerged as a source of conflict between them. Indeed, her husband became very angry with her every time she mentioned the need for him to stop gambling. He always responded to such suggestion by leaving the marital house for days and sleeping at his office every night. During that time, he never gave her living allowance or paid any attention to his family. In order to ‘teach’ him a lesson, she then reported her husband’s gambling to his superior, particularly as her husband and his friends had actually gambled in the office at the night time after working hours. This behaviour was an infringement of the applicable Code of Ethics; however, the response of both her superior (as well as her husband’s superior) was not positive. Ignored by her superior, she then reported that case to the local police, but the local police officer was reluctant to respond the report. She went to other police stations in the greater district expecting that the police officer there would have a better response to her report. Unfortunately, the police officer in this place was also reluctant to respond and to process her case; the reason he supplied for his inaction seemed unreasonable to her, namely that the persons involved were both legal officers.   
By the end of 2012, they began to live separately but remained in a legal marriage. The husband boasted of several ‘love affairs’ with other women to his friends. RHY herself had also investigated the matter and found that that SJ had had liasons with three women.  She tried to stay strong, but she could not stand it any longer more when she learnt that her husband had an affair with the fourth woman who worked as a masseur. She then had arranged to raid on her husband with the woman in 2013. She had asked a neighbourhood administratoe, as well as her son (from her first marriage) who works as a police officer and some journalists to witness the raid which was held at midnight. The raid was then published in a local newspaper and she then reported her husband behaviour to her superior.​[42]​ Nevertheless, his relationship with the woman continued. Rather than cause the relationship come to an end and prompt a return to his wife, the raid and the ongoing relationship seemed to become the important reasons for SJ to apply for divorce from RHY in 2014. 
Rhy did not want be divorced because it was her second marriage, and she wanted her marriage to Sj become the last marriage. She even has made a statement that she did not mind living in a polygamous marriage as long as she still had a husband. Unfortunately, her statement to keep Sj as her husband was effortless because Sj did really insist to divorce her. Finally, his application to divorce Rhy was approved by Religious Court in 2015. 
The Religious Court approved his application but also Court ordered him to pay living allowance to RHY. Moreover, as a state court officer and as the litigant who asked for divorce, SJ had an obligation to give his one third of salary to his ex-wife and the children. The third of the salary is allocated by the state treasurer, but SJ did not want to give it voluntarily, and persisted on failing to pay it to his ex-wife. RHY then reported that situation to her superior; however her superior could not do anything, maintaining that it was her former husband’s right to deny giving his salary to his ex-wife regardless of the reasons. She was deeply disappointed with such a reason, and finally she sought help to a legal aid to sue or have her ex-husband prosecuted for neglecting to her. 
B. Access to the Legal System 
1. Religious Court: Disappointing decision at the higher level 
RHY and SJ married in the Islamic manner, although RHY was a Christian at the time. Although after their marriage she converted to Islam, she converted back to Christianity in 2016 with her husband’s permission. She said that her reason for doing so included that to he was not a good head of the family, he never prayed, he neglected her and the child, and he also cheated on her etcetera. When SJ applied for divorce he had used the difference in religion as the reason that had affected the harmony of the marriage. The Religious Court appoved his application and the verdict stated that SJ would have to fulfil his responsibility and give the appropriate (religiously demanded) living allowance to his ex-wife, such as iddah and kiswah. However, Sj objected to the Religious Court’s verdict, he then appealed to the Higher Religious Court, sending his application for a review of the need to pay living.​[43]​ He appealed to Higher Religious Court because he did not want to pay the living. He then sent the application to high Religious Court.
The Higher Religious Court accepted his appeal and, although the matter of their different faiths had not been a matter considered relevant by the Religious Court (Pengadilan Agama) in determining payment of a living, the Higher Religious Court (Pengadilan Tinggi Agama) took it into account. Its decision nullified the decision of Religious Court, This also means that RHY has no chance to appeal the decision on that basis to the Supreme Court. She is very disappointed by the Higher Religious Court’s decision and the legal system which has not stood by her side as a domestic violence victim. However, she has found some errors in law in the court proceedings and in the judges’ considerations in making decision (which to her mind is unreasonable).   

2. Badan Kepegawaian Negara (Civil Services Agency) must give one-third of ex-husband’s salary to the woman he divorces
	As a woman divorced by a male civil servant, RHY is entitled to obtain one-third of her ex-husband’s salary as stated in Article 8 of PP 10/83.​[44]​ In response to her ex-husband withholding his salary, RHY reported her situation to Badan Kepegawaian Negara (Civil Service Agency). According to the agency, SJ was obligated to give her a one-third of his salary. Furthermore, the legislation stated that:
a civil servant who denied to share one-third salary on the basis article 8 of PP 10/83 (Government Regulation No. 10/83) and of article 16 of PP 45/1990 (Government Regulation No 45/1990 to amend PP 10/883) will be punished by one kind of severe administrative sanction. The sanction will be implemented on the basis of Peraturan Pemerintah No 30 tahun 1980 tentang Peraturan Disiplin Pegawai Negeri Sipil yang telah diubah dengan PP 53 tahun 2010 (Government Regulation No. 30 of 1980 on the Civil Servants Disciplinary Regulations, as amended by Regulation 53 of 2010).
	
The Badan Kepegawaian Negara responded quite positive in dealing with her case. it continually reiterated that the state treasurer shall submit one third salary directly to ex-wife and children as a result of divorce. The salary must be undertaken without waiting for the employee who had divorced his wife to instruct the employer to do so (Article 18 of the Circular Head BAKN 48 / SE / 1990 on the instructions of implementing government regulation No. 45 of 1990 on the Amendment of Government Regulation No. 10/83 on Marriage and Divorce Permits for Civil Servants).
3. Criminal proceedings: Attorney general department’s officer asks for a ‘strong’ evidence   
Before the divorce proceeding had been decided by Religious Court in May 2015, RHY reported her then husband’s neglect and his psychological violence (particularly when her then husband had affairs with other women) to police at the end of 2014. She supplied the evidence needed to have her husband prosecuted, including her psychological medical record from a psychiatrist which provided evidence of her distress, the newspaper report the raid that was evidence of her husband’s affair, and the bank statement of her husband’s salary, which clearly demonstrated his financial neglect. The police response to her report was positive; however, the case is likely to be processed very slowly because the attorney general department’s officer is not satisfied with the evidence provided by the police and RHY.
The officer argued that RHY’s financial situation does not appear to be neglected as RHY still works. The Attorney General Department’s officer needs ‘strong’ evidence to convince judges that neglect has made the victim a poor woman – it means that she must give convincing proof that she was in financial difficulties, for example lacking money, lacking daily food and being in very poor circumstances. In this case, being resourceful and providing not only for her children and herself but often for her husband, actually appears to work against a conviction of her then husband/soon to be ex-husband.
In responding to the prosecutor’s inquiries, the police argued that the approach went further than the law provided and it didi not make sense that since the victim is a working woman she live in penury with her children by not exerting herself, nor that he be relieved of his legal obligation to support her because of her (most necessary) resourcefulness, given the circumstances that the then husband had created. The police argued that all the elements of neglect in Article 9 of Domestic Violence Act 2004 had been fulfilled and the husband should be prosecuted accordingly.​[45]​ The elements of neglect are satisfied when a husband fails to meet the demand of the legislation, that is, that “…according to law and agreements, the [male] person has an obligation to provide basic necessities or to look after family members”. The law mentioned in this Act is the Marriage Act 1974 (Undang-Undang Perkawinan 1974) which states that a husband has an obligation to give his wife a living allowance; infringement of this obligation gives the affected party the right to sue (in civil proceeding) and/or have the negligent party prosecuted (in criminal proceeding).
 To support the police by providing the evidence demanded by the attorney, RHY has asked for support from Komnas Perempuan (Women Commission) and Komnas HAM (Human Right Commission). Komnas Perempuan stated that the institution supported the process of criminal prosecution of the act committed by SJ. Indeed, the police must have a deep concern for the victims of domestic violence as vulnerable women. Komnas Perempuan agrees that the elements within article 9 of Domestic Violence Act were satisfied. Further, the Komnas is deeply concerned by the situation as Article 9 never requires an examination of the financial capabilities of the perpetrator and the victim. Hence, RHY continues to work on an appeal as she believes (and others as seen) it is not only unreasonable to expect her to ignore her husband’s neglect of her and the children. She also believes, as do others (as seen above), that to failure to prosecute his neglect has no basis in law. Based on this argumentation, Komnas Perempuan agreed that the police to prosecute SJ for his infringement of both the Domestic Violence Act and the Marriage Act.​[46]​ 
Komnas HAM has also supported RHY’s case, particularly in regard to her husband’s infidelity. The Commission insisted that police process her report professionally – because as a citizen RHY has the equal rights before the law, that is, the right to obtain justice – all  of which right are guaranteed by the Indonesian Constitution in Article 28 D, 14 of Act No 12/2005 on Ratification of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and articles 3(2) and 17 of the Act on Human Rights No 39/1999.​[47]​
The prosecutor recently asked her to provide a letter from the neighbourhood administrative officer declaring her to be a ‘poor’ woman. Such a letter is usually provided to  the poor so they can obtain government-provided health, education, and other social welfare benefits. This letter has also been required for the poor to access ‘pro bono’ assistance in court proceedings within the legal system. RHY disagrees with the idea of providing the prosecutor with such a letter because she is not in such dire circumstance. She argues that:

…it is impossible for me to obtain such a letter because I am not in such circumstance. Moreover, I don’t want to declare myself as a ‘poor’ woman because I am a working woman and my neighbours know me well as a state court officer. Once I declare myself as a ‘poor’ woman, it means that I cheated on myself. It is embarrassing…​[48]​

	The request for an official declaration of her status as a ‘poor’ woman demonstrates the prosecutor’s thinking in domestic violence cases, especially where the victim of neglect is a working woman. Her status as a working woman cannot be compared with that of a house-wife, because a husband’s financial neglect is offset by her earnings. In her case, however, employment and earnings had been necessitated by his continual financial neglect of her and the children. Her financial capability did not impact on her distress. She argued that while the ‘poor letter’ is really needed for the victims of domestic violence who has little or no earnings (or earning capacity) because they are only housewives who depend financially on their husbands. The prosecutor does not seem to currently take into account the phenomena of working women whose situation differ from that of house-wives, but whose circumstances do not remove the husband’s obligation to provide financial (and emotional) support in a marriage that has been legally contracted, nor a living after divorce where the law requires. 

4. The State Court Office: Unfair administrative sanction implemented 
In disclosing and reporting her case to her superior at the State Court Office in Semarang City, RHY expected to obtain justice and that her husband would be have an administrative sanction applied against him; instead, she appears to have been treated unfairly. Not only was her husband punished but also RHY herself. Both of them have been removed to other state courts in the different smaller cities. These sanctions are severe sanctions according to Article 3(17) and 19 (17) of PP No 53/2012 on Discipline of Civil Servants, and in Article 9(1) and (2) of SK KMA 122 / KMA / SK / VII / 2013 on the Code Violations by Clerks and Bailiffs. Article 3(17) and 9(17) state the sanctions to be applied by an official following the rules set by the competent authority as referred to in Article 3(17) when violations have a negative impact on the agency. Article 9 (1) and (2) states that clerks and bailiffs are obliged to maintain the honor and integrity and harmony of a household outside the office; and (2) they are required to have a sense of responsibility to family. Those breaking such a provision do risk severe sanction. However, the application of this sanction in this case has demonstrated that gender bias still exists in Indonesian courts. It is obviously that the perpetrator of domestic violence (of financial neglect, causing psychological distress) is RHY’s husband, SJ, and RHY is the victim, but the court demanded that RHY to receive the same sanction. It seems that the court did not want to blame SJ alone, but chose to allocate blame for the situation on the one who brought the ‘messy’ situation to public notice through launching court action and publicing the matter in the press through her organisation of a raid on the husband and his mistress. But it must be asked whether ‘punishing the victim’ (who is seeking justice for herself and her children) is just? The State Court office discounted her situation as the victim of the domestic violence, and appeared to prioritize the reputation of the court and its personnel generally. Alternatively, the State Court Office appeared to still have the perspective that it is a wife’s responsibility to maintain marital harmony and peace. Thus, as her marriage was in trouble according to this view, she could not have done her job as a good wife; consequently she must be punished through an administrative sanction as well as her husband. 
It can be argued that the court, a legal institution on which people rely when looking for justice, had treated RHY unfairly, based on her gender. The Court ignored its obligation to support and protect the victim of domestic violence. Furthermore, the State Court Office –as a legal institution and a part of Indonesian legal system – has the responsibility to implement the Domestic Violence Act 2014 regardless of the victims’ identity (such as gender, civil servant or common person et cetera). 
5. Summary of legal responses
	Based on the material presented above, the experience of Rhy has demonstrated that she understood that she was a victim of domestic violence. She tried to resolve the violence (neglect, and psychological violence caused by her husband’s relationship with another woman) by reporting the matter to her (and her husband’s) superior. However, she could not obtain positive response. She even had an administrative sanction applied for actions involved in accessing her rights, rights stated by Domestic Violence Act 2014, the Act passed to protect the victim of domestic violence. 
Another infringement of her rights was of her right to obtain the living allowance as a wife of civil servant (as stated in PP 10/1983). Instead of helping her to implement the legislation dealing with the living allowance, the State Court office accepted her husband’s statement that he did not want to give her the living allowance involuntarily. Furthermore, the Higher Religious Court has made a disappointing decision by nullifyng the verdict of Religious Court which dealt more positively with the living allowance. 
In the context of the criminal justice system, the response of the prosecutor has also demonstrated that the legal system does not truly support women’s rights as the victims of domestic violence, although the police have affirmed the existence of neglect as defined by Article 9 of Domestic Violence Act. The prosecutor’s argumentation that the element of neglect experienced by RHY was not enough for the matter to be brought to Court because the prosecutor assumed that it would probably not have convinced the judges showed the lack of understanding of the two diverse legal apparatus when dealing with neglect and forms of psychological violence. 
	Unsurprisingly, the understanding of domestic violence in the legal context has (in Indonesia as elsewhere) been initially mostly focused on physical violence rather than other forms, such as psychological, economic and sexual violence. Consequently, processing cases involving physical violence before the court (criminal court) is easier than for other forms of violence because of the effects of physical violence on the woman’s appearance are obvious and there is an ability to document injuries. The legal apparatus of the criminal justice system will find greater difficulty in obtaining and providing the evidence for non-physical violence. The failure to recognize non-physical violence by including it in domestic violence legislation and thus its failure to enable women or the legal apparatus to launch proceedings in regard to instances of non-physical violence may affect women’s willingness to initiate proceedings. It may also undermine their trust in the state that is necessary for them to overcome their situation through accessing the legal system in order to obtain justice.  

IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, RHY ‘broke the silence’, and she did so in a number of legal for a and quite publicily and with her employer, exploring every known legally available avenue to obtain justice. She had initiated her actions by responding to turning point by thinking about and conceptualizing what was happening to her. She recognized her husband’s neglect as a form of domestic violence. Although she tried to communicate with her husband to resolve the issues nothing changed. The financial neglect and psychological impacts of his unfaithful behaviour continued until their divorce had been decided by the Court, and even afterwards – her ex-husband denied her living allowance. She had tried various strategies to decrease or stop the violence by reporting the case to her superior, police officers and the Religious Court. However, she felt that the responses and the resulst were disappointing. The legal system which was she had approached to maintain her rights and obtain justice still seemed far away and justice difficult to obtain. This is particularly ironic for RHY as a court employee. The government has legislated to provide support and protection to female civil servants, but when she experienced domestic violence the legislation and all the legal system did not seem to work for her. Gender bias and power imbalance still appear to permeate the space – continuing to grant her husband and ex-husband a privileged position, The Courts (criminal, civil and religious) to which she had recourse did not satisfy her need for justice and recognition of her rights as a victim of domestic violence and a woman forced by circumstances to support her family.
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